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1. Introduction
In January 2007, in theLubanga case,1 Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC I) of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) ruled that Article 30 of the Rome Statute (ICCSt.) encompasses
the three degrees of dolus, namely, dolus directus of the first and second degrees and do-
lus eventualis. In September 2008, in the Germain Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui case,2
PTC I refrained from relying on the elusive concept of dolus eventualis for the mental
element in relation to the crimes charged and accordingly the decision lacks any discus-
sion on whether the concept of dolus eventualis has a place within the framework of Ar-
ticle 30 ICCSt.3 Accordingly, theDefence for the first accused requested leave to appeal
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Confirmation of Charges.4 The Third and the
Fourth Issues for which leave to appeal has been requested relate to the PTC I distinc-
tion between the notion of dolus directus of the second degree and dolus eventualis and
the Chamber’s approach not to entertain the question of whether or not the notion of
dolus eventualis is part of the general subjective element provided for inArt. 30 ICCSt.5
The Defence contended that the introduction of dolus eventualis through the backdoor
may have an impact on the ultimate issue of guilt and that the doctrine of dolus directus
of the second degree should be given a correct interpretation.6
This paper examines the different degrees of intentionality under Art. 30 ICCSt.; it
draws a firm distinction between dolus directus of the second degree and dolus eventua-
lis; and attempts to answer the question whether the notion of intent’ as provided for in
Art. 30 ICCSt. encompasses the triplet forms of dolus, namely, dolus directus of the first
and second degree and dolus eventualis. In so doing recourse will be made to various
legal systems of the World which recognise dolus eventualis as a sufficient mental state
for intentional crimes. Based on the comparative survey the paper concludes that dolus
eventualis is one of the genuine and independent pillars of criminal responsibility which
forms, on its own, the basis of intentional crimes and suggests its inclusion in the legal
standard of Article 30 ICCSt.
1 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 29 January 2007.
2 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 30
September 2008.
3 Ibid., para. 531.
4 Defence Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,Ger-
main Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 6 October 2008.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., para. 23.
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2. Background on the Lubanga and Katanga Decisions
On 29 January 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber 1 (PTC I) of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) rendered its decision confirming the charges against ThomasLubangaDyilo.7Ac-
cording to the Prosecution, Lubanga was the leader of theUnion des Patriots Congolais
(UPC) – later renamedUnion des Patriots Congolais/Rconciliation (UPC/RP) – and a
commander-in-chief of its armed military wing, the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libra-
tion du Congo (the FPLC). Lubanga, the first accused to appear before the ICC, was
charged under the relevant articles of the ICC Statute with the war crimes of conscript-
ing and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into an armed group – the FPLC
– and using them actively in hostilities.8 As for the form of criminal responsibility, the
Prosecution charged Lubanga under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute, which covers
the notion of direct perpetration, co-perpetration and indirect perpetration (see Chart
No. 1 below). In examining the concept of co-perpetration, as embodied in the ICC Sta-
tute, Pre-Trial Chamber I has devoted a lengthy discussion regarding themens rea stan-
dards under Article 30 of the ICC Statute.
On 26 September 2008, PTC I of the ICC confirmed all but three of the charges against
Germain Katanga (a DRC national), alleged commander of the Force de rsistance pa-
triotique en Ituri [Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri] (FRPI) and Matthieu Ngudjolo
Chui (a DRC national), alleged leader of the Front des nationalistes et intgrationnistes
[Nationalist Integrationist Front] (FNI). The Chamber confirmed seven counts of war
crimes and three counts of crimes against humanity. The judges found insufficient evi-
dence to try Katanga and Ngudjolo for inhuman treatment and outrages upon personal
dignity (war crimes). The Chamber also declined the charge of inhumane acts (crime
against humanity). The Chamber confirmed the following war crimes committed during
an attack on Bogoro village, on or about 24 February 2003: (1) Using children under the
age of fifteen to take active part in the hostilities; (2) Directing an attack against a civi-
lian populations as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostili-
ties; (3) Wilful killings; (4) Destruction of property; (5) Pillaging; (6) Sexual slavery;
7 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 29 January 2007.
8 See Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the ICCSt.
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and (7) Rape. The Chamber also confirmed the following crimes against humanity: (1)
Murder; (2) Rape; and (3) Sexual slavery.
InKatanga andNgudjoloChui the PTC I analysed principal responsibility underArticle
25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute. Based on the Lubanga Decision,9 the PTC I found that
when a criminal offence is committed by a plurality of persons, the definitional criterion
of the concept “joint commission” is linked to the distinguishing criterion between prin-
cipals and accessories to a crime.’10
In defining the elements for the commission of the crime through another person the
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui PTC I based its findings mainly on German law and litera-
ture (mittelbare Tterschaft).11 Mittelbare Tterschaft or perpetration by means, also
known as indirect perpetration’ or indirect perpetratorship’, is characterized by the
predominance of the perpetrator-by-means (Hintermann), who uses the person that phy-
sically carries out the crime (Tatmittler) as his instrument.12 The perpetrator by means
controls the situation because he has superior knowledge or superior powers in relation
to the agent.’13 However, indirect perpetratorship’ is not limited to situations where the
physical perpetrator is an innocent agent, or has a defence such as insanity or infancy. In
such cases, an innocent agent is a meremachine whosemovements are regulated by the
principal.’14 Rather, the notion of indirect perpetration also applies even where the di-
rect and physical perpetrator is criminally responsible (indirect’ perpetrator behind the
direct’ perpetrator orTter hinter demTter).15 According to theKatanga PTC this lat-
ter scenario,Tter hinter demTter, is themost relevant to international criminal law in
which the perpetrator behind the perpetrator commits the crime through another by
means of “control over an organization” (Organisationsherrschaft).’16
9 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 29 January 2007.
10 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, para. 480.
11 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, paras. 495–518. The
second clause of § 25(1) of the dStGB (German Criminal Code) is concerned with the princi-
pal bymeans (mittelbarer Tter) a person who acts through the agency of another (Tatmittler).
See M. Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 156.
12 A. Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in Antonio Cassese et al., (eds.) The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: ACommentary (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,
2002), 793–795. For an informative discussion of Article 25 ICCSt. see G. Werle, Individual
Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice
(2007) 953–975.
13 M. Bohlander, supra note 11, at 156. See also para. 497 of the Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui
decision on the confirmation of charges: “The underlying rationale of this model of criminal
responsibility is that the perpetrator behind the perpetrator [Tter hinter demTter] is respon-
sible because he controls the will of the direct perpetrator.”
14 G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed., London: Stevens & Sons, 1961), 349–
350. As noted by Professor Michael Bohlander, supra note 11, at 156 German jurisprudence
and commentators have acknowledged five categories according to which a person can be
considered as an instrument:
1. The agent is not fulfilling either the actus reus or mens rea of the offence.
2. The agent lacks a specific mens rea component or has a mens rea for a different offence.
3. The agent is acting objectively lawfully (rechtmßig) under an accepted defence.
4. The agent is acting without personal guilt (schuldos) under an accepted defence.
5. The agent lacks criminal capacity.
15 K. Ambos, Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 478, margin 9.
16 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,
para. 498.
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The PTC I found that the commission of the crime through another person – the third
variant of principal liability underArticle 25(3)(a) of the ICCStatute – encompasses the
perpetrator behind the perpetrator by means of control over an organisation.17
As regards themental elements, theChamber held that the personsmust be aware of the
factual circumstances enabling them to exercise control over the crime through another
person, such as the character of the organisation, their authority within the organisation,
and the factual circumstances enabling near-automatic compliance with their orders.18
In examining the subjective elements of the war crime of pillaging the PTC I had this
to say: The intent and knowledge requirement of article 30 of the Statute applies to
the war crime of pillaging under Article 8(2)(b)(xvi). This offence encompasses first
and foremost, cases ofdolus directusof the first degree. Itmay also includedolus directus
of the second degree. However, this offence additionally requires two [mental] element,
or dolus specialis. First the act of physical appropriationmust be carried out with the in-
tent to deprive the owner of his property. Second, the act of physical appropriationmust
also be carriedwith the intent to utilise the appropriated property for private or personal
use.’19 The PTC I found both dolus directus of the first and second degree sufficient to
trigger the criminal responsibility for most of the crimes charged.20
3. The meaning of intent under Article 30 ICCSt.
In order to hold a person criminally responsible and liable for a crime within the juris-
diction of the ICC, it must be established that the material elements of the offence were
committedwith intent and knowledge. This is expresslymentioned in paragraph 1 ofAr-
ticle 30 ICCSt: Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if thematerial
elements are committedwith intent and knowledge.’21 The term intent’ as set out inAr-
ticle 30 has two different meanings, depending upon whether the material element re-
lated to conduct or consequence. A person has intent in relation to conduct, if he means
to engage in the conduct’,22 whereas in relation to consequence, a person is said to have
intent if that person means to cause that consequence’ or is aware that it will occur in
the ordinary course of events’.23
17 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,
paras. 500–518. See also M.E. Badar and N. Karsten, Current Developments at the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals’, 9 International Criminal Law Review (2009) 227–251, at 234–237.
18 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,
paras 534, 538.
19 Ibid., paras. 331–332.
20 As for to the subjective element of the crimes of sexual slavery and rape the PTC I found that
both crimes include, first and foremost, dolus directus of the first degree. They also may
include dolus directus of the second degree’, (para. 346); as for the war crime of inhumane
acts the PTC I found that this offence encompasses dolus directus of the first and second
degree (para. 359); for the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity the PTC I stated that
this subjective element includes, first and foremost, dolus directus of the first degree and dolus
directus of the second degree.’ (para. 372).
21 Article 30 ICCSt. For the drafting history of Article 30 ICCSt. see R. S. Clark, The Mental
Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court and the Elements of Offences’, 12 Criminal Law Forum (2001) 291–334.
22 Article 30(2)(a) ICCSt.
23 Article 30(2)(b) ICCSt.
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A. Direct intent or dolus directus of the first degree
In theLubanga case,24 the first test ever of Article 30 ICCSt., PTC I of the ICC asserted
that the reference to intention and knowledge in a conjunctive way requires the exis-
tence of a volitional element on the part of the suspect.25 This volitional element refers
first to situations inwhich the suspect (i) knows that his acts or omissionswillmaterialize
thematerial elements of the crime at issue; and (ii) he undertakes these acts or omissions
with the concrete intention to bring about thematerial elements of the crime.According
to the PTC I, the above-mentioned scenario requires that the suspect possesses a level of
intent which it called dolus directus of the first degree.26
This form of intent is equivalent to the Model Penal Code culpability term purposely’.
Section 2.02 of theModel Penal Code considers a person acts purposely’ with regard to
a result if it is his conscious object to cause such result.27 InUnited States v. Bailey et al.,
the Supreme Court ruled that a person who causes a particular result is said to act pur-
posefully if he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result hap-
pening fromhis conduct.’28Dolus directus of first degree, inGerman criminal law, is also
identical to direct intent’ as defined in Article 30(2)(b) ICCSt. According to a recent
commentary on the German Criminal Code dolus directus of the first degree covers si-
tuation in which the will is directly focused on the result.29
B. Oblique intent or dolus directus of the second degree
Article 30(2)(b) ICCSt. assigns a second alternative of intent with regard to the conse-
quence element, providing that even if the perpetrator does not intend the proscribed
result to occur, he is considered to intend that result if he is aware that [the conse-
quence] will occur in the ordinary course of events’. In the Lubanga case the PTC I as-
serted that Article 30 encompasses other aspects of dolus, namely dolus directus of the
second degree.30 This type of dolus arises in situations in which the suspect, without hav-
ing the actual intent to bring about the material elements of the crime at issue, is aware
that such elements will be the necessary outcome of his actions or omissions.31 This de-
gree of mens rea is akin to knowledge or awareness rather than intent in stricto sensu.
This position is supported by the definition given to knowledge in paragraph 3 ofArticle
30, [f]or the purpose of this article, “knowledge” means awareness that . . . a conse-
quencewill occur in the ordinary course of events.’ The essence of the narrowdistinction
between acting intentionally and knowingly with regard to the consequence element is
the presence or absence of a positive desire or purpose to cause that consequence.
In the criminal law of England, as well as in other Common law jurisdictions, the terms
knowingly’ or knowledge’ can be seen as playing the same role in relation to circum-
24 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.
25 Ibid., para. 351.
26 Ibid.
27 Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(a)(i).
28 United States v. Bailey et al., 444 U. S. 394; 100 S. Ct. 624; 62 L. Ed. 2 d 575; U. S. Lexis 69,
November 7, 1979, Argued, January 21, 1980, Decided, at 632. See alsoUnited States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 445 (1978).
29 Cramer and Sternberg-Lieben Vor § 15’ in T. Lenckner et al., Schçnke & Schrçder Strafge-
setzbuch Kommentar (27th ed., Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2006), margin 65.
30 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo” para. 352.
31 Ibid.
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stances as intention plays in relation to consequence.32 Logically speaking, there is no
offence which requires the prosecution to prove that the accused, in the true sense, in-
tended a particular circumstance to exist at the time he or she carries out his or her act.33
If the accused intends a circumstance to exist, it means that he or she hopes it exists or
will exist. In England, statutory offences constituted upon proof that a particular cir-
cumstance exists often include an express requirement of knowledge as to this circum-
stance.34 In this kind of legislation, the requirement of knowledge is generally inter-
preted as applying to all the circumstances of the offence in question, unless the statute
makes the contrary meaning plain.35 That is not to say that the word knowingly’ is in-
capable of applying to consequences. Where knowingly’ appears, courts will normally
construe it as applying to all the elements necessary for the actus reus. The following case
is illustrative on this matter. InWestminster City Council v. Croyalgrange Ltd and An-
other,36 Dwas charged of knowingly using, causing or permitting the use of any premises
as a sex establishment without a licence, contrary to the Local Government (Miscella-
neous provisions) Act 1982. Apparently, in this case there were two relevant circum-
stances: (1) the premises were being used as a sex establishment; and (2) this use was
not in accordance with the licence. In this case, the House of Lords concluded that
knowledge of both circumstances was necessary. The concept of wilful blindness’ was
considered by Lord Bridge to be an alternative to actual knowledge:
[. . .] it is always open to the tribunal of fact, when knowledge on the part of a defendant is required
to be proved, to base a finding of knowledge on evidence that the defendant had deliberately shut
his eyes to the obvious or refrained from inquiry because he suspected the truth but did notwant to
have his suspicion confirmed.37
The plain meaning of Article 30(2) ICCSt. makes it clear that once the prosecution de-
monstrates that an accused, in carrying out his conduct, was aware that the proscribed
consequence would occur, unless extraordinary circumstances intervened, he is said to
have intended that consequence. Thus, a soldier who aims to destroy a building, while
not wishing to kill civilians whom he knows are in the building, is said to intend the
killing of the civilians (Article 8[2][a][i] ICCSt.) if the building is in fact destroyed
and the civilians are killed.38 Hence, a result foreseen as virtually certain is an intended
result.39
Another question which remains unsettled is whether knowledge under Article 30
ICCSt. encompasses the common law notion of “wilful blindness” or “wilfully shutting
one’s eyes to the obvious”. This concept first originated in England in R. v. Sleep
(1861).40 Since then, English courts have extended the meaning of knowledge to cover
32 P.Murphy andE. Stockdale (eds.),Blackstone’sCriminal Practice (Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press, 2002), 27.
33 R. Heaton, Blackstone’s Criminal Law, (London: Blackstone Press, 1996), 63.
34 An example of an express requirement of knowledge is the offence of knowingly possessing
explosives, Explosive Substances Act 1883 section 4.
35 G. Williams, Text Book of Criminal Law, (2nd ed., London: Stevens & Sons, 1983), 123.
36 Westminster City Council v. Croyalgrange Ltd and Another [1986] 2 All ER 353 (HL).
37 Ibid., at 359, per Lord Bridge.
38 As suggested by G. Werle and F. Jessberger, “Unless Otherwise Provided” –Article 30 of the
ICC Statute and the Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law’, 3 Journal
of International Criminal Justice (2005) 35–55, at 41 fn. 34.
39 R. v. Woollin, [1999] 1 A.C. 82, 96.
40 R. v. Sleep [1861] C.C.R. All ER (Reprinted) 248, 252. In this case, the Court for the Con-
sideration of Crown Cases Reserved (C.C.R.) held that [t]he jury have not found, either that
the prisoner knew that these goodswereGovernment stores, or that hewilfully shut his eyes to
the fact.’ Ibid., at 252 per Willes, J.
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cases of wilful blindness’ or second degree knowledge’.41 InWestminster CC v.Croyal-
grange Ltd, Lord Bridge stated that:
[. . .] it is always open to the tribunal of fact, when knowledge on the part of the defendant is re-
quired to be proved, to base a finding of knowledge on evidence that the defendant had deliber-
ately shut his eyes to the obvious or refrained from inquiry because he suspected the truth but did
not want to have his suspicion confirmed.42
Professor Glanville Williams gave the doctrine an accurate but a narrower definition:
A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant ac-
tually knew. He suspected the fact; he realized its probability; but he refrained from obtaining the
final confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny knowledge. This and this
alone, is wilful blindness. It requires in effect a finding that the defendant intended to cheat the
administration of justice. Any wider definition would make the doctrine of wilful blindness indis-
tinguishable from the civil doctrine of negligence in not obtaining knowledge.43
Hence, wilful blindness applies only when D is virtually certain that the fact exists. To
put it differently, if D deliberately shuts his eyes’ to the obvious, because he doesn’t
want to know,’ he is taken to know.44Most notably, English courts that accepted the con-
cept of wilful blindness adopted the same approach that such blindness constitutes ac-
tual knowledge, or a substitute for actual knowledge.45Any attempts to stretch thewilful
blindness doctrine by accepting some lesser degree of knowledge instead of actual
knowledge would blur the distinction between wilful blindness’ and recklessness’.
InGriffiths,46 a case of handling stolen goods knowing or believing them to be stolen, the
English Court of Appeal implicitly distinguished between wilful blindness’ and reck-
lessness’:
To direct the jury that the offence is committed if the defendant, suspecting that the goods were
stolen, deliberately shut his eyes to the circumstances as an alternative to knowing or believing
the goods were stolen is a misdirection. To direct the jury that, in common sense and in law,
they may find that the defendant knew or believed the goods to be stolen because he deliberately
closed his eyes to the circumstances is a perfectly proper direction.47
Thus,English courtsconsidered theword suspecting’asa lesserdegreeofknowledge that
doesnot satisfy the thresholdofactualknowledge,nor it canbeconsidered theright test to
establish wilful blindness’ on the part of the defendant. Professor GlanvilleWilliams re-
markably observed that “the word knowing’ in a statute is very strong”. He contended,
[t]o know that a fact exists is not the same as taking the chancewhether it exists or not.’48
It is worth noting that Canadian Courts have paid more attention in distinguishing wil-
ful blindness’ from recklessness’. The ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in Sans-
regret is illustrative in thismatter.49 This was a case of rape. Considering all the evidence,
the Supreme Court found that
41 The phrase knowledge of the second degree’ was coined by Devlin J in Rober v. Taylor’s
Central Garages [1951] 2 TLR 284. The term connivance’ was considered as best calculated
to describe the second sort of knowledge which carries with it criminal liability. See Edwards,
The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge’, 17Modern Law Review (1954) 294–320, at 298.
42 Westminster City Council v. Croyalgrange Ltd and another [1986] 2 All ER 353 at 359 (HL).
43 Williams, The General Part, supra note 14, at 57, 159 (emphasis added).
44 Williams, Text Book of Criminal Law, supra note 35, at 125.
45 See Roper v. Taylor’s Central Garage (Exeter) Ltd (1951) 2 TLR 284, K.B.
46 Leslie George Griffiths v. R. [1974] 60 Cr App R 14 (CA).
47 Leslie George Griffiths v. R. [1974] 60 Cr App R 14, at 18 (CA) (emphasis added).
48 Williams, Text Book of Criminal Law, supra note 35, at 126.
49 Sansregret [1985] 45 C.R. (3d) 193 S.C.R., cited in D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law, A
Treatise, (4th ed., Canada: Thomson Canada Limited, 2001), 230.
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the accused had beenwilfully blind as to the nature of B’s consent. He had been aware of the like-
lihood of the victim’s reaction to his threats. To proceed with intercourse in such circumstances
constituted self-deception to the point of wilful blindness.50
The Supreme Court found that because the accused had believed that the consent had
been freely given and not procured by threat, there could be no room for recklessness,
but the conviction could nevertheless be based on wilful blindness. In drawing the dis-
tinction between wilful blindness and recklessness, the Supreme Court stated:
Wilful blindness is distinct from recklessness because, while recklessness involves knowledge of a
danger of risk and persistence in a course of conduct which creates a risk that the prohibited result
will occur, wilful blindness arises where a person who has become aware of the need for some in-
quiry declines tomake the inquiry because he does not wish to know the truth. He would prefer to
remain ignorant. The culpability in recklessness is justified by consciousness of the risk and by pro-
ceeding in the face of it, while in wilful blindness it is justified by the accused’s fault in deliberately
failing to inquire when he knows there is reason for inquiry.51
The Supreme Court agreed with the narrow scope given to this concept by Glanville
Williams. Despite its clarity, the law of Sansregret has been criticised on the basis that
the doctrine of wilful blindness might become a test of objective negligence.52 Since
then, most Canadian courts have been rigorous in ensuring that the test remains subjec-
tive. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Duong emphasised such position:
Wilful blindness refers to a state ofmindwhich is aptly described as deliberate ignorance . . .Actual
suspicion, combined with a conscious decision not to make inquiries which could confirm that sus-
picion, is equated in the eyes of the criminal law with actual knowledge. Both are subjective and
both are sufficiently blameworthy to justify the imposition of criminal responsibility.53
While some legal scholars view the second alternative of intent as excluding concepts of
dolus eventualis or recklessness,54 others advocate the inclusion of recklessness and do-
lus eventualis in the legal standard of Article 30.55 As far as the drafting history is con-
cerned, Professor Roger Clark noted that
50 Ibid.
51 45 C.R. (3d) 193 at 206, quoted in Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law, supra note 49, at 230.
52 Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law, supra note 49, at 231.
53 Duong, [1998] 15 C.R. (5th) 209 (Ont. C.A.) at 402, cited in Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law,
supra note 49, at 231.
54 A. Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections’,
10 European Journal of International Law (1999) 144–171, at 153–54: While it is no doubt
meritorious to have defined these two notions [intent and knowledge in Article 30], it appears
questionable to have excluded recklessness as a culpable mens rea under the Statute.’; J.D.
Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens Rea in Interna-
tional Criminal Law’, 12Miami International and Comparative Law Review (2004) 57–149, at
64–5: AntonioCassese has criticized the ICCStatute for not recognizing “recklessness” as the
basis of liability for war crimes. However, if one takes into account the resolve to confine the
jurisdiction of the ICC to “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole,” it is reasonable to accept that crimes committed without the highest degree of
dolus ought as a general rule not to be prosecuted in the ICC.’; Werle and Jessberger, supra
note 38, at 53: the requirements of the perpetrator’s being aware that the consequence will
occur in the ordinary course of events or of the perpetrator’s meaning to cause that conse-
quence (Article 30(2)(b) ICCSt.) excludes both forms of subjective accountability. It thus
follows from the wording of Article 30(2)(b) that recklessness and dolus eventualis do not
meet the requirement.’
55 D.K. Piragoff and D. Robinson, Article 30 –Mental Element’, in Otto Triffterer, (ed.),Com-
mentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by
Article, (2nd ed., Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008) 849–861, at 860; H.H. Jescheck, The General
Principles of International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Sta-
tute’, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004) 38–55, at 45. F. Mantovani, The Gen-
eral Principles of International Criminal Law: TheViewpoint of aNational Criminal Lawyer’,
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dolus eventualis fell out of the written discourse before Rome. Recklessness, in the sense of sub-
jectively taking a risk to which the actor’s mind has been directed, was ultimately to vanish also
from the Statute at Rome, with again only an implicit decision as to whether it was appropriate
for assessing responsibility.56
Professor Otto Triffterer has suggested that since Article 30(2)(b) explicitly states will
occur’ and not might occur’, it would not be enough to prove that the perpetrator is
aware of the probability of the consequence and nevertheless carrying out the conduct
which results in the proscribed consequence.57As for themeaning of “will occur” as pro-
vided for in Article 30(2)(b)ICCSt. Triffterer had this to say: Though only “will occur”
ismentioned in article 30, wouldn’t it be enough that the perpetrator is aware that a con-
sequence might occur and nevertheless engages in taking action tending in that direc-
tion, thereby accepting its consequences? Though this then is the typical notion of reck-
lessness in common law countries, it may well be sufficient for dolus eventualis in some
civil law countries.’58
Professor Albin Esser viewed the phrase “will occur in the ordinary course of events” as
requiring the prosecution to demonstrate that the perpetrator foresees the consequence
of his conduct as being certain unless extraordinary circumstances intervene.59
4. Dolus Eventualis, Recklessness, Article 30 and the Lubanga Decision
Aware that the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc Tribunals has recognised other degrees
of culpablemental states than that of direct intent (dolus directus of the first degree) and
indirect intent (dolus directus of the second degree),60 the ICC PTC I went further, as-
suring that the volitional element mentioned above also encompasses other aspects of
dolus, namely dolus eventualis.61 Arguably, the PTC I reached its conclusion that dolus
eventualis has a place within the framework of Article 30 based on its understanding of
the notion of criminal intent’ as recognized in civil law jurisdictions rather than stretch-
ing the phrase aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events’ to include this
form of dolus. In this regard, it is worth pointing out that in the penal codes of countries
which adhere to theRomano-Germanic legal traditions it is rare to find an explicit men-
tion of the notion ofdolus eventualis though courts and scholars recognise it as a part and
parcel of the criminal intent which is sufficient to trigger the criminal responsibility for
intentional crimes. The issue of whether dolus eventualis has a definite meaning and
components in national jurisdictions will be dealt with in detail in the following section.
1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 26–38, at 32: . . . the ICC Statute’s provision
on the mental element (Article 30) appears to limit itself to intent (dolus) alone, thereby
excluding negligence (culpa). Using ambiguous and psychologically imprecise wording . . . It
. . . does include intent and recklessness (dolus eventualis) . . .’
56 Clark, supra note 21, at 301.
57 See O. Triffterer, The New International Criminal Law – Its General Principles Establishing
Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in K. Koufa (ed.), The New International Criminal Law
(Athens: Sakkoulas Publications, 2003) 639–727, at 706.
58 Ibid.
59 A. Eser, Mental Elements-Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law’, in A. Cassese et al., (eds.),
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: ACommentary, vol. 1, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002) 889–948, at 915: . . . the perpetrators being aware that the action will
result in the prohibited consequence . . . with certainty . . .’
60 M.E. Badar, Drawing the Boundaries of Mens Rea in the Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’, 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006)
313–348.
61 Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1, para. 352.
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According to the Pre-Trial Chamber dolus eventualis applies in situations in which the
suspect (a) is aware of the risk that the objective elements of the crimemay result from
his or her actions or omissions, and (b) accepts such an outcome by reconciling himself
or herself with it or consenting to it.’62 The Pre-Trial Chamber found it necessary to dis-
tinguish between two types of scenarios regarding the degree of probability of the occur-
rence of the consequence from which intent can be inferred:
Firstly, if the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is substantial (that is, there is
a likelihood that it “will occur in the ordinary course of events”), the fact that the suspect accepts
the idea of bringing about the objective elements of the crime can be inferred from:
(i) the awareness by the suspect of the substantial likelihood that his or her actions or omissions
would result in the realisation of the objective elements of the crime; and
(ii) the decision by the suspect to carry out his or her actions or omissions despite such awareness.
Secondly, if the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is low, the suspect must
have clearly or expressly accepted the idea that such objective elements may result from his or her
actions or omissions.63
However, in situations where the suspect’s mental state falls short of accepting that the
objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, such a
state of mind cannot qualify as a truly intentional realisation of the objective elements,
and hence would notmeet the “intent and knowledge” requirement embodied in article
30 of the Statute.’64
As for the exclusion of the concept of recklessness from the realm of Article 30 of the
ICC Statute the PTC I had this to say:
The concept of recklessness requires only that the perpetrator be aware of the existence of a risk
that the objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, but does
not require that he or she reconcile himself or herself with the result. In so far as recklessness does
not require the suspect to reconcile himself or herself with the causation of the objective elements
of the crime as a result of his or her actions or omissions, it is not part of the concept of intention.65
It is significant in this regard to recall Professor Antonio Cassese’s concerns, almost
eight years prior to the Lubanga decision, regarding the exclusion of the notion of reck-
lessness by the drafters of the Rome Statute:
While it is no doubt meritorious to have defined these two notions [intent and knowledge in Ar-
ticle 30], it appears questionable to have excluded recklessness as a culpable mens rea under the
Statute. One fails to see why, at least in the case of war crimes, this last mental element may not
suffice for criminal responsibility to arise. Admittedly, in the case of genocide, crimes against
humanity and aggression, the extreme gravity of the offence presuppose that it may only be per-
petrated when intent and knowledge are present. However, for less serious crimes, such as war
crimes, current international law must be taken to allow for recklessness: for example, it is admis-
sible to convict a person who, when shelling a town, takes a high an unjustifiable risk that civilian
will be killed – without, however, intending, that they be killed – with the result that the civilians
are, in fact, thereby killed.66
Professor Cassese continued his criticism regarding the exclusion of recklessness as a
culpable mental element under the Rome Statute in the following words:
Hence, on this score the Rome Statute marks a step backwards with respect to lex lata, and possibly
creates a loophole: persons responsible forwar crimes,when theyacted recklessly,maybebrought to
trial and convicted before national courts, while they would be acquitted by the ICC. It would seem
that the draughtsmen have unduly expanded the shield they intended to provide to the military.67
62 Ibid., para. 352 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
63 Ibid., paras. 353–354.
64 Ibid., para. 355.
65 Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1, footnote 438.
66 Cassese, Some Preliminary Reflections’, supra note 54, at 153–154.
67 Ibid., at 154.
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However, it would be a profoundmistake to draw fromCassese’s hypothetical example
that those persons will escape justice by claiming that their main aim was merely shel-
ling a military objective and that they lack any intention regarding the killing of civi-
lians. In such situations, those actors can incur criminal responsibility under the con-
cept of dolus eventualis if the prosecution succeeds in demonstrating that in shelling
the towns, it was probable that those civilians would be killed and that the actors accept
such a result.
Professor Kai Ambos viewsArticle 30 ICCSt. to exclude the notions of dolus eventualis
and recklessness:
Certainly, reckless conduct cannot be the basis of responsibility since a corresponding provision
was deleted [during the drafting of Art. 30 ICCSt]. The same applies for the higher threshold of
dolus eventualis: this is a kind of “conditional intent” by which a wide range of subjective attitudes
towards the result are expressed and, thus, implies a higher threshold than recklessness. The per-
petrator may be indifferent to the result or be “reconciled” with the harm as a possible cost of at-
taining his or her goal . . . However, [in such situations of dolus eventualis] the perpetrator is not, as
required by Article 30(2)(b), aware that a certain result or consequence will occur in the ordinary
course of events. He or she only thinks that the result is possible. Thus, the wording of Article 30
hardly leaves room for an interpretation which includes dolus eventualis within the concept of in-
tent as a kind of “indirect intent.”’68
ProfessorsRogerClark andGerhardWerle adopt the same viewofAmbos assuring that
Article 30 of the ICC Statute leaves no room for dolus eventualis or recklessness’
though the subject is still highly disputed.69 Professor Joachim Vogel notes that the
main reason of such confusion is that intent and knowledge are defined in
Art. 30(2)&(3) of the Statute of the ICC under clear influence of the common law prin-
ciples, but in amanner that is a compromise and therefore not consistent and notwithout
overlaps, and applies to dolus eventualis in theGerman understanding (awareness that a
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.’70
Since there is a lack of consensus among legal scholars on whether dolus eventualis or
recklessness falls under the realm of Article 30 ICCSt and since the Lubanga decision
assertion is not legally binding on the ICC Trial Chambers and that the last word on
that issue will be for the ICCAppeal Chamber it is significant in this regard to elaborate
on themeaning and the contour of recklessness and dolus eventualis from a comparative
criminal law perspective.
5. The meaning of Recklessness in the Model Penal Code
No aspect of the Model Penal Code has had greater influence on the direction of
American criminal law than § 2.02 of the Code, which provides general rules for the
definition of liability.71 It is considered the single most important provision of the
68 K.Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in theRome Statute’, 10Criminal LawForum
(1999) 1–32, at 21–22.
69 G.Werle,Principles of International Criminal Law (TheHague: T.M.C.Asser, 2005) 113–114;
Roger Clark, Elements of Crimes in Early Decisions of Pre-Trial Chambers of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court’, New Zealand Yearbook of International Law (2009) (forthcoming):
But dolus eventualis and its common law cousin, recklessness, suffered banishment by con-
sensus. If it is to be read into the Statute, it is in the teeth of the language and history.’
70 J. Vogel, Vor § 15’, in H.W. Laufhtte et al. (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch Leipziger Kommentar
(12th ed., Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007), margin 95.
71 Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, (3rd ed., United States: Mathew Bender &
Company, 2001), 137.
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Code’,72 and the most significant and enduring achievement of the Code’s drafters.73
General Requirement of Culpability’, as provided for in § 2.02, has been described
as the representative of the modern American culpability scheme.74 This Section ar-
ticulates the Code’s fundamental requirement that unless some element of mental
culpability is proved with respect to each material element of the offence, no valid
criminal conviction may be obtained.75 Thus, the minimal statement is that one may
not be convicted of a crime unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negli-
gently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offence.’76
Accordingly, the Code eliminated ill-defined and confusing culpability terms and re-
placed them with four carefully defined hierarchical levels.77 Each of these levels of
culpability is defined to each of the material element’ of the offence which may in-
volve conduct, attendant circumstances, and/or result.78 Thus, the Model Penal Code
firmly establishes the concept of element analysis’ in place of offence analysis.’ The
former concept requires the Prosecution to prove that the defendant carried out the
material elements of the offence with a culpable state of mind.
Generally speaking, recklessness is the most common level at which criminal liability at-
taches, and it is considered the default’ requisitemental state inmany jurisdictions when
72 H.L. Packer, TheModel Penal Code and Beyond’, 63Columbia Law Review (1963) 594–607
at 601.R.M. Perkins, ARationale ofMensRea’, 52HarvardLawReview (1939) 905–923; F. J.
Remington & O.L. Helstad, The Mental Element in Crime – A Legislative Problem’, Wis-
consin Law Review (1952) 644–678, at 648–49.
73 See P.H. Robinson, A brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Liability’, 31 Hastings Law
Journal (1980) 815–853, at 815–821 (describing the advances made by the drafters of the
Model Penal Code and outlining the distinctions among the Code’s culpability terms.)Contra
seeP.Brett,An Inquiry intoCriminalGuilt (Sydney: TheLawBookCo. ofAustralia, 1963) 70–
85 (arguing that culpability should be a simple judgment of moral blameworthiness made by a
jury, not the result of codification efforts); E. S. Binavince, The Structure and Theory of the
German Penal Code, 24American Journal of Comparative Law (1976) 594–601, at 600 (com-
plimenting the drafters of the German Penal Code for abandoning the effort to define culp-
ability terms because such definition curtails the dynamic quality of the law).
74 Robinson, ibid., at 815.
75 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, at 229. § 2.02 (1) of theMPC which entitled Minimum
Requirements of Culpability’ reads as follows: Except as provided in Section 2.05, a person is
not guilty of an offence unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the
law may require, with respect to each material element of the offence.’
76 Model Penal Code, § 2.02(1). The only exception of this general requirement is the narrow
allowance for offences of strict liability in § 2.05 of the Code, limited to cases where the most
severe sentence that may be imposed is a fine.
77 The definition of the further elements of culpability was the hardest drafting problem in the
framing of the Code. American law has employed an abundance of mens rea terms, such as
general and specific intent, malice, wilfulness, wantonness, recklessness, scienter, criminal
negligence, and the like . . . clarification was essential and it was attempted by a bold submis-
sion in the draft.’ See H.Wechsler, Codification of the Criminal Law in the United States’U:
The Model Penal Code, 68 Columbia Law Review (1968) 1425–1456, at 1436; see also S.H.
Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler’s Predecessors’, 78 Columbia Law Review
(1978) 1098–1144, at 1143 (crediting the drafters of theModel Penal Code with dispersing the
obscurantist cloud that hung for so long on the central mens rea issues in criminal law’).
78 § 1.13(9) of the Model Penal Code defines an element of an offence’ to include conduct,
attendant circumstances or results that are included in the description of the offence; that
establish the required kind of culpability; that negate an excuse or justification for an offence;
that negate a defence under the statute of limitations; or that establish jurisdiction or venue.
§ 1.13(10) of the Model Penal Code defines the concept of material element’ to include all
elements except those that relate exclusively to statute of limitation, jurisdiction, venue, and
the like. The material elements’ of offences are thus those characteristics (conduct, circum-
stances, result) of the actor’s behaviour that, when combined with appropriate level of culp-
ability, will constitute the offence in question.
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a statute is silent with regard to themental state required for a crime.79 The term reckless-
ness, asused in theCode, involves conscious risk creation, anelementwhichdifferentiates
it from acting either purposely or knowingly. It is a state of mind distinct from intent.80
Under the Model Penal Code, recklessness, however, resembles acting knowingly in
that a state of awareness is involved, but the awareness is of risk, that is, of a probability
less than substantial certainty.81 Recklessness also shares some attributes with negli-
gence. Both concepts require the existence or creation of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that circumstances exist or that a result will occur. But the reckless actor must sub-
jectively believe that he is creating a substantial risk. In terms of the gravity of the culp-
ability involved, recklessly falls between knowingly and negligently.
The Code provides that a person acts recklessly’ if (1) he consciously disregards a sub-
stantial and unjustified risk that the material element exits or will result from his con-
duct.’82 According to the Code, a risk is substantial and unjustifiable’ if considering
the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him,
its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation.’83
Recklessness as provided for in § 2.02(2)(c) has both subjective and objective aspects.
The risk of which the actor is aware must be substantial and unjustifiable in order for
the recklessness judgment to be made.84 It is immaterial whether the risk relates to
the nature of the actor’s conduct, to the existence of the attendant circumstances, or
to the result that may ensue.85 In United States v. Albers,86 it was held that a finding of
recklessness may only be made when persons disregard a risk of harm of which they
are aware.87
A. Conscious disregard – the subjective component of recklessness
The requirement that the actor consciously disregard the risk is themost significant part
of the definition of recklessness. It is this concept which differentiates a reckless actor
from a negligent one.88 The negligent actor is a person who fails to perceive a risk
that he ought to perceive. The reckless actor is a person who perceives or is conscious
of the risk but disregards it.89 Hence, in many offences where the law provides that reck-
lessness is the minimum level of culpability, negligence will not suffice. Accordingly,
“the distinction between conscious disregard’ and failure to perceive’ will often signify
the difference between conviction and acquittal.”90
79 A.C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State’, 71 Southern California Law Review
(1998) 953–1036, at 959.
80 U. S. v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3 d at 1146.
81 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 2.02 Comment at 236.
82 Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(c).
83 Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(c).
84 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 2.02 Comment at 237.
85 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 2.02 Comment at 236–37.
86 United States v. Albers, 226 F. 3 d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2000).
87 United States. v. Albers, 226 F. 3 d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2000), citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U. S. 825, 836–37 (1994) (emphasis added); see also United States. v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259
F.3 d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001).
88 D.M. Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code’, 9 American Journal of Criminal
Law (1981) 281–386, at 351.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
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Even though theModel Penal Code does not define the meaning of the term conscious
disregards’, the Commentary of the Code, in a comparison made between knowledge
and recklessness, assists in clarifying the meaning of that term:
Recklessness involves conscious risk creation. It resembles acting knowingly in that a state of
awareness is involved, but the awareness is of risk, that is of a probability less than substantial cer-
tainty; the matter is contingent from the actor’s point of view.91
B. Substantiality and unjustifiability of the risk
According to the Code, in order to trigger the criminal liability for recklessness, the risk
ofwhich the actor consciously disregardsmust be substantial andunjustifiable. The draf-
ters of theCodeassured that the threshold test shouldbe conjunctive rather thandisjunc-
tive. The reason is even substantial risks may be created without recklessness when the
actor seeks to serve a proper purpose.’92 These two adjectives describing the risk shed
more heat than light for these are terms of degree, and the acceptability of a risk in a gi-
vencasedependsonagreatmanyvariables.’93Accordingly, thedraftersof theCodewere
of the opinion that some standard is needed for determining how substantial and how
unjustifiable the riskmust be in order towarrant a finding of culpability.94 TheCommen-
tary of the Code states that a trier of fact is asked to perform two distinct functions:
First, it is to examine the risk and the factors that are relevant to how substantial it was
and to the justifications for taking it. In each instance, the question is asked from the
point view of the actor’s perceptions, i. e., to what extent he was aware of risk, of factors
relating to its substantiality and of factors relating to its unjustifiability. Second, the jury
is to make the culpability judgment in terms of whether the defendant’s conscious dis-
regard of the risk justifies condemnation.Considering the nature andpurpose of his con-
duct and the circumstances known to him, the question is whether the defendant’s dis-
regard of the risk involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would have observed in the actor’s situation.95
C. Recklessness vis--vis § 2.02(7)
The commentary of the Code claimed that § 2.02(7) described reckless’ rather than
knowing conduct’. As a comment to the Code notes, whether § 2.02(7) should be con-
sidered a knowledge or recklessness standard presents a subtle but important ques-
tion.’96 One scholar, however, argued that § 2.02(7) defines a hybrid mental state that
falls somewhere between knowledge and recklessness.97 In an attempt to draw the bor-
der lines between the two concepts, one scholar pointed out that:
Guided by the intuition that some mental states should be treated no differently from actual
knowledge, the Model Penal Code drafters formulated § 2.02(7) as a definition of knowledge of
fact. This decision is justified by the high level of certainty that § 2.02(7) requires. Recklessness
by contrast, “requires a conscious of something far less than certainty or even probability.”98
91 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 2.02 Comment at 236.
92 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 2.02 Comment at 237.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 2.02 Comment at 248.
97 R. Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Liability’, 70 Texas Law Review (1992) 1351–
1430, at 1429.
98 J. L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) andWillful Blindness’, 102Yale Law Journal
(1993) 2231–2258, at 2239.
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A further distinction is that mistaken belief negates culpability under § 2.02(7) but does
not negate recklessness.99 The following example is illustrative on that matter. D be-
lieves the gun he points at his friend is empty (because his parents told him that the
gun was rarely loaded). D pulls the trigger; the gun fires, causing his friend’s death. D
couldn’t be convicted of knowingly shooting his friend because he was not aware of
high probability that the gun was loaded, and he actually believed the gun to be empty.
D could be, however, convicted for recklessness because he consciously disregarded a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the gun was loaded.100
D. Reckless homicide manifesting extreme indifference to human life
The Model Penal Code includes a form of recklessness as a sufficient mental state of
murder. Pursuant to § 210.2(b) of theModel Penal Code, criminal homicide constitutes
murderwhen it is committed recklessly under circumstancesmanifesting extreme indif-
ference to the value of human life.’101 Reading § 210.2(1)(b) in conjunction with
§ 2.02(2)(c) (the general definition of recklessness), reckless murder’ may be defined
as the conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result
from the actor’s conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, given the
nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, his dis-
regard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding per-
son would observe in the actor’s situation.’102
By demonstrating such indifference to the value of human life, the reckless killer, there-
fore, deserves to be bracketed with a killer who kills purposely or knowingly. The stan-
dard, set out in § 210.2, is subjective; it does not extend to inadvertent risk-taking. The
Code provision makes clear that inadvertent risk creation, however extravagant and
unjustified, cannot be punished as murder.’103 Hence, negligent creation of homicidal
risk, though sufficiently extreme, may not support liability for murder.
The Commentary of the Model Penal Code reemphasized that the concept adopted in
§ 210.2(1)(b), which includes –within themurder category – cases of homicide causedby
extreme recklessness, thoughwithout purpose to kill, reflects the common lawandmuch
pre-existing statutory treatment. In order to sustain this position, the drafters referred to
the following cases:
– On the third try, the defendant shot his friend dead in a game of Russian roulette. The
Court affirmed the conviction for murder, despite ample evidence that the defendant
had not desired to kill his friend.104
– The defendant shot V dead. The defendant claimed he intended to shoot over V’s
head in order to scare him. The Court held that, even crediting this assertion, the
jury could find the defendant guilty of murder on the grounds that his act showed
99 Ibid., at 2240.
100 Ibid.
101 Model Penal Code, § 210.2(1)(b). The second sentence of subsection (1)(b) reads as follows:
Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice
in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to
commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, bur-
glary, kidnapping or felonious escape.’
102 Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(c).
103 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 210.2 Comment at 27–28.
104 Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180, 188, 47 A.2 d 445, 447 (1946) quoted inModel Penal
Code and Commentaries, § 2.02 Commentary at 23.
Some Reflections on Article 30 of the Rome Statute in Light of the Lubanga & Katanga
123
{luchterh_neu}20090229_triffterer/kap02.3D 24.07.2009 S. 124
such a reckless disregard for human life as was the equivalent of a specific intent to
kill.’105
– A defendant fired several shots into a house which he knew to be occupied by several
persons.Hewas convicted ofmurder on the grounds that his conduct was imminently
dangerous’ and evinced a wicked and depraved mind regardless of human life.’106
To sum up, under § 210.2(1)(b), the actor must perceive and consciously disregard the
risk of death of another before the conclusion of recklessness indifference can be
drawn.107
6. The Contour of Dolus Eventualis in Comparative Criminal Law
A. Egypt
The Egyptian Penal Code does not set general principles for dolus eventualis, except
when it tackles the accomplice liability in Article 43 of the penal code which stipulates:
He who participates in a crime shall bear its penalty, even though the resulting crime is
not the one he has in advance intended, as long as the crime that actually took place is a
probable result for his instigation, agreement, or assistance.’ On 25 December 1930, the
Egyptian Court of Cassation issued a judgment in case no. 1835 (judicial year 47).108 The
Court adopted the idea of acceptance’ as an essential element in the concept. TheEgyp-
tian Court of Cassation decided that
dolus eventualis substitutes intent, in the strict sense of the word, in establishing the element of in-
tentionality. It can only be defined as a secondary uncertain intention on the part of the perpetrator
who expects that his act may go beyond the purpose intended to realize another purpose that was
not intended initially but nevertheless performs the act and thus realizes the unintended purpose.
As a result of this intention, it becomes irrelevant whether the consequence takes place or not. The
purpose of formulating the definition in this way is to clarify that intention must be present in all
circumstances, to include all forms of such intention and to exclude other caseswhere the intention
is not established, in a bid to calling for caution in order not to confuse premeditation with mere
error. The practical key to knowing if dolus eventualis is established or not is to ask the question:
while undertaking the intended act, did the perpetrator want to do it even if the act goes beyond its
original purpose to the criminal act that actually happened and was not originally intended? If the
answer is yes, dolus eventualis is established. If the answer is no, then the whole matter is nothing
more than an error that may be punishable or not depending on whether the conditions establish-
ing an error are present. Answering the question, of course, relies on such evidence as confession,
proofs or presumptions. Therefore, dolus eventualis is not established in the following scenario: X
intends to kill Y by poisoning a piece of sweets and offering it toY.Y keeps the piece of sweets that
Z finds, eats and accordingly dies. In this case, the accused shall be punished for the attemptedmur-
der of Y and shall not be punished for killing Z under the pretext of dolus eventualis. This is be-
cause the secondary intention is not established; only the focused intention is established, and
that is fulfilling the original purpose and it does not go beyond to any other criminal purpose.109
105 Myrick v. State, 199 Ga. 244,249, 34 S. E.2 d 36, 40 (1945), quoted inModel Penal Code and
Commentaries, § 2.02 Commentary at 23.
106 Hill v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2 d 261 (1931) quoted inModel Penal Code and
Commentaries, § 2.02 Commentary at 23.
107 Contra see the discussion that took place in the recent UK Law Commission Report on
Homicide in which a proposal to assign a culpable state of reckless indifference’ to the crime
of second degree murder was subject to criticism by judges and academic scholars. See the
UK Law Commission Report on Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, Project 6 of the
Ninth Programme of Law Reform: Homicide (Law Com. No 304) paras. 2.99–2.107, at 38–
39, available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk (last assessed 1 April 2009).
108 Series of Legal Principles decided by the Egyptian Court of Cassation, Part II, Principle no.
135, at 168.
109 Judgment, Egyptian Court of Cassation, Case No. 1853/Judicial Year 47, 25 December 1930.
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B. France
In French criminal law, neither statute nor case-law provides any general definition of
intention, and it has been left to academics to analyse its meaning.110 In French criminal
law, a distinction is made between two forms of intent, namely, dol gnral and dol spe-
cial. French scholars also recognise the concept of dol ventuel, which is where the de-
fendant merely foresees the possibility of the result but he or she does not desire its oc-
currence. However, this form of dol does not amount to dol special and hence is not a
mental state that will support a conviction for meurtre, whether in its simple or one of
its aggravated forms.111 Under the new French Criminal Code,112 however, dol ventuel
may amount to a lesser fault and it is treated as an aggravating factor in relation to in-
voluntary murder and non-fatal offences against the person.113
C. Italy
Dolus eventualis is recognized under the Italian criminal law as dolo eventuale. Pursuant
to Article 43 of the Italian Codice Penale, all serious crimes require proof of the mental
element known as dolo, which means that the prohibited result must be both preveduto
(foreseen) and voluto (wanted). Yet, a result may be voluto even though it is not desired
if, having contemplated the possibility of bringing it about by pursuing a course of con-
duct, the perpetrator is prepared to run the risk of doing so (dolo eventuale). Even a
small risk may be voluto if the defendant has reconciled himself to, or accepted it as a
part of the price he was prepared to pay to secure his objective.114
D. South Africa
In SouthAfrican criminal law, an amalgam of Roman-Dutch and English law, fault may
take two broad forms, namely, intention (dolus) or negligence (culpa). Intention is di-
vided into four standards, namely, dolus directus, dolus indirectus, dolus eventualis
and dolus indeterminatus.115 All forms of intention are assessed subjectively and dolus
eventualis is a sufficient form of mens rea for all crimes based on intention.116 A clear
statement on the definition of intention is given in the Draft Criminal Code of South
Africa: A person has intention to bring about a result of his conduct if (a) it is his aim
to bring about the result [dolus directus]; (b) he knows that his conduct would of neces-
sity bring about the result [dolus indirectus]; (c) he foresees the possibility of the result
flowing from his conduct and reconciles himself to this possibility [dolus eventualis].
110 Article 121–3 of the French Penal Code states: There is no felony or misdemeanour in the
absence of an intent to commit it.’
111 On French criminal law see J. Bell, S. Boyron and S. Whittaker, Principles of French Law,
(1998); B. Dikson, Introduction to French Law, (1994); E. GarÅon,Code pnal annot (1901);
C. Elliot, The French Law of Intent and Its Influence of the Development of International
Criminal Law’, 11 Criminal Law Forum (2000) 35–46.
112 Entered into force on 1 March 1994.
113 See Articles 221–3, 222–19, 222–20 and 223–1 of the new French Criminal Code.
114 See F. McAuley and J. P. McCutcheon, Criminal Liability (London: Sweet &Maxwell, 2000)
301–303.
115 J. Burchell, Chapter 13 –Criminal Law’ inC.G.VanderMerwe and J. E. Plessis, Introduction
to the Law of South Africa, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 463.
116 Ibid.
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In a very recent judgment, SC vanAardt v.The State,117 the SupremeCourt ofAppeal of
South Africa reached a verdict of murder upon proof of dolus eventualis on the part of
the accused. The Supreme Court of Appeal refers to Holmes JA observation on the
mens rea requisite for murder in the case of S v. Sigwahla:118
1. The expression intention to kill’ does not, in law, necessarily require that the accused should
have applied his will to compassing the death of the deceased. It is sufficient if the accused subjec-
tively foresaw the possibility of his act causing death and was reckless of such result. This form of
intention is known as dolus eventualis, as distinct from dolus directus.
2. The fact that objectively the accused ought reasonably have foreseen such possibility is not suf-
ficient. The distinctionmust be observed betweenwhat actually went on in themind of the accused
andwhat would have gone on in themind of a bonus paterfamilias in the position of the accused. In
other words, the distinction between subjective foresight and objective foreseeability must not be-
come blurred. The factum probandum is dolus, not culpa. These two different concepts never co-
incide.
3. Subjective foresight, like any other factual issue, may be proved by inference. To constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt the inferencemust be the only onewhich can reasonably be drawn.
It cannot be so drawn if there is a reasonable possibility that subjectively the accused did not fore-
see, even if he ought reasonably to have done so, and even if he probably did do so.
E. Germany
In the German legal system dolus eventualis occurs in situation in which the offender
does not aim for the materialisation of the elements of the offence or does not foresee
the fulfilling of the elements as virtually certain but he or she considers it to be possi-
ble.119
German literature, as well as courts, treated dolus eventualis differently according to
various theories. As remarkably noted by Professor Michael Bohlander they range
from theories that decline to entertain, to differing degrees, any volitional element
for example from the mere awareness of a possibility of the result occurring, to its prob-
ability’U, the requirement that D must envisage an unreasonable risk, or a manifesta-
tion of avoidance efforts, to those that require a volitional element, again to differing
degrees, such as the approval theories which make the mental consent of the offender
to the result, should it occur, the decisive parameter, to those that let an attitude of reck-
less indifference suffice, in other words if D says I could not care less’.120 What is com-
mon to all of them is that the defendant must have been aware of the fact that his actions
may lead to an offence being committed.’121
It is worth pointing out that German courts, following the tradition of the Reichsgericht
and the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court of Justice (BGH), adhere to a
somewhat watered-down approval theory, yet the approval does not need to be explicit
and the offender need notmorally approve of the result – it is sufficient if he or she ac-
cepts it nevertheless in order to reach his or her ulterior goal.’122 Most notably in the
more recent case law, German courts have put strong emphasis on distinguishing be-
tween the essence of the cognitive and volitional elements and inferring their existence
117 StephanusCornelius vanAardt v. The State, CaseNo. 179/08 [2008]ZASCA169 (2December
2008).
118 S v. Sigwahla, 1967 (4) SA 566 (A).
119 Cramer and Sternberg-Lieben Vor § 15’ in T. Lenckner et al., Schçnke & Schrçder Strafge-
setzbuch Kommentar (27th ed., Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2006), margin 72.
120 Bohlander, supra note 11, at 4–65.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid, at 65, footnotes omitted.
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from the evidence about the external conduct of the defendant.123 The Federal Supreme
Court has adopted the approach that if the defendant is acting in an objectively highly
dangerous situation and still goes aheadwith his or her plans without being able to claim
realistically that nothing bad will happen, the volitional element may be more easily in-
ferred than in less clear-cut situations, where the danger is not readily recognisable.’124
In light of the aforementioned, we might conclude that in the German legal system act-
ing with dolus eventualis requires that the perpetrator perceive the occurrence of the
criminal result as possible and not completely remote, and that he endorses it or at least
makes peace with the likelihood of it for the sake of the desired goal. In the case of ex-
tremely dangerous, violent acts, it is obvious that the perpetrator takes into account the
possibility of the victim’s death and, since he continues to carry out the act, he is pre-
pared to accept such a result. The volitional element (acceptance) denotes the border-
line between dolus eventualis and advertent or conscious negligence.
7. Islamic Jurisprudence
Islamic tradition, like other major religious traditions, does not consist of, or derive
from, a single source. Sharı¯ah is based on a variety of sources. These sources are cate-
gorised by Muslim scholars into primary and supplementary sources.125 The Qur’an is
the fundamental and original source of the Sharı¯ah; the Sunnah is considered the sec-
ond primary source and is as such next in importance to the Qur’a¯n.126 After the Pro-
phet’s death (632 C.E.), the need for a continuing process of interpretation of the
Qur’a¯n became more acute.127 This led to the development of supplemental sources
of law to apply whenever the two primary sources were silent on a given question. Ij-
tiha¯d128 (independent interpretation) was needed to answer new questions – and new is-
sues that necessitated new thought and laws – resulting from the expansion of Islam into
new societies and cultures. This exercise of Ijtihad during the eighth and ninth centuries
led to the development of four schools of jurisprudence. These schools are the Hanafi,
the Maliki, the Shafai and the Hanbali. They were named respectively after the four
founders and are followed today by the vast majority of Sunni Muslims.129
Although Muslim jurists did not identify a theory for dolus eventualis, they mentioned
the hypotheses which if united, specified and formulated, would establish one of the
most updated theories of that notion. In his treatise Criminal Responsibility in Islamic
Jurisprudence, Professor Ahmad Fathy Bahnasy quoted various views of Muslim jurists
where conditional intent or dolus eventualis was deemed sufficient to hold a person
123 Ibid., with reference to 46 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (BGHSt),
at 35.
124 Ibid., with reference to 36 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (BGHSt),
at 1.
125 M. Abou-Zahra, al-Jarı¯ma wa-al- uqba fi al-fiqh al-Isla¯mı¯, vol. 1, (Cairo: Da¯r el-Fikr al-
Arabı¯, 1998).
126 Abd al-Qa¯dir Awda, al- Tashrı¯ al- Jina¯’ı¯ al-Isla¯mı¯ muqa¯ranan bi-l-qa¯nn al-wadı¯, (Cairo:
Dar al-Sherk, 2001) vol. 1, part 2, at 144.
127 On the Rules of Interpretation see M.H. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cam-
bridge: The Islamic Text Society, 2003) 117–186.
128 Ijtihad is a technical term of Islamic law that describes the process of making a legal decision
by an independent interpretation of the legal sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The op-
posite of ijtihad is taqlid, Arabic for imitation’. For a detailed consideration of Ijtihad, see
Kamali, ibid., at 60.
129 Ibid.
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criminally liable for intentional crimes.130 Thus, for example, we read inAl-Mogtabi that
IbnAbdeen has said the intent of killing is not a precondition formurder. If the offender
sought to injure only man’s hand (i.e., had no intent to kill) and injures his neck (i. e. the
man dies), this shall be deemed intentional murder; and if he injures another person’s
neck (i. e., someone else dies), this shall be deemed accidental homicide.131 This means,
according to Professor Bahnasy, that if the offender thought to merely injure a person’s
hand, it is imperative that he expects in his conditional intent (dolus eventualis) that he
may injure this person’s neck, causing his death. Thus, it shall be deemed intentional
murder.132
8. Distinguishing Dolus Eventualis fromDolus Directus of the SecondDegree
In dolus directus of the second degree there must be a correlation between the desired
consequence (dolus directus of the first degree) and the pertinent consequence (dolus
directus of the second degree).133 This correlation is inevitable, indispensable and im-
perative and must always exist; consequently, this type of intent is termed an intent of
imperative consequences.134 Yet, if we were faced with a result that was an inevitable
and indispensable consequence of the first, where the occurrence of the first would
mean a definite occurrence of the second, then, for the second result, this will be consid-
ered as a dolus directus of the second degree.135
On the other hand, if the second consequence, sequential to the first, was expected by
the perpetrator to potentially ensue, then, even under the highest degree, we would
be facedwith dolus eventualis.136 In other words, if the second consequence hadmultiple
probabilities where its occurrence as a consequence of the first was questionable, with
the assumption that the perpetrator was not surprised by it in the occasion it did occur,
then this will be considered as dolus eventualis.
In terms of legal value, there exists no difference between both types of dolus directus of
the first and second degree; intentionality is present in both.137 Parity between both
types is justified by the fact that the direction of awill towards an incident is imperatively
a direction towards any act known to be indispensably related thereto.138 Moreover,
there also exists no difference in terms of legal value between both types of dolus direc-
tus and dolus eventualis on which premeditated crimes are based by reason of existence
of both the potential contemplation of the consequence, but rather non-absolute, and
the acceptance of its occurrence. These two factors are considered the elements of crim-
inal intent in its general formaswell as of direct intent, with both its types, represented in
knowledge and will.139
130 A.F. Bahnasy, al-Masleya al-Jena¯e’ ı¯ah fi al-Fiqh al-Isla¯mı¯: Dera¯ssa Feqheı¯a Muqa¯ranah,
(Cairo: al-Halaby Publisher, 2nd ed., 1969) 151.
131 Ibid., at 153.
132 Ibid.
133 Abou el-Magd Aly Eisa, al Qasd al Gena’ı¯ al-Ehtemaly: Derasah Ta¯’sileyah Tahlileya Mu-
qaranah, (Conditional Intent: Analytical and Comparative Study), (Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-
Arabia, 1988), 314.
134 Ibid., 313–14.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., at 314.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
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9. A Proposed Definition for Dolus Eventualis
Since criminal intent is generally defined as the perpetrator’s knowledge’ of the ele-
ments of the crime as prescribed by law and his will’ to implement those elements,
and based on the definition given to that notion by the Egyptian Court of Cassation
in its ruling in case no. 1835 (judicial year 47), discussed above, Professor Eisa proposed
the following definition for dolus eventualis:
It is a form of criminal intent which satisfies the threshold for the mental element of intentional
crimes. It is an unfocused intent that occurs when the perpetrator foresees the possibility that
the consequence of his act exceeds the goal he intended – whether legitimate or illegitimate –
to another unlawful goal which he did not intend initially, and nevertheless performs the act, re-
conciling himself with the consequences . . .140
Professor Eisa went further clarifying each element of his proposed definition for the
notion of dolus eventualis:
a) Describing it as intent’ means that the element ofwill has supreme importance in its
formation while calling it unfocused’ is intended to distinguish between this type of
intent and dolus directus which is focused directly upon implementing the illegiti-
mate consequence.
b) Saying that it occurs to the perpetrator’ refers to the fact that this intent was not ori-
ginally leading to the criminal consequence that resulted from his act;
c) The statement foresees the possibility that the consequence of his act exceeds the
goal he intended . . .’ is meant to show that it is important to be a realistic foresight
and hence it cannot be replaced by a possible or necessary foresight. This also shows
the importance of realistic foresight as a basis for intention. In addition, the state-
ment refers to the fact that it is a subjective foresight as the focus is on the perpetra-
tor’s personality when performing his act. It should not also be conclusive or inevi-
table while it can be only possible. This is considered an accurate definition of the cri-
terion and amount of the foresight required to build the concept of dolus eventualis.
d) Describing the original act as legitimate or illegitimate’ is meant to confirm the in-
dependence of dolus eventualis aswell as the fact that it does not need to be preceded
by another criminal intent in order to have a predetermined crime.
e) The statement to another unlawful goal which he did not intend initially, and never-
theless performs the act’ confirms the reliance on what revolves in the perpetrator’s
mind concerning his attitude towards the criminal consequence that may result from
the act.
f) The expression reconciling himself with the consequences’ is meant to highlight that
we favour the theory of consent which is considered a crucial element for establishing
dolus eventualis on the part of the accused. Failing to proof this element of acceptance
the act will no longer be intentional; it may however be considered mistaken con-
duct.141
10. General Remarks
Based on this comparative survey it is evident that dolus eventualis is a form of intent
that has its distinctive identity. It is considered the basis of the mental element in inten-
tional crimes, which stands independently from any other criminal intent that precedes
or supports it. The perpetrator’s intent may be legitimate at the beginning, but then he
140 Ibid., at 669.
141 Ibid., at 669–670.
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foresees that his act may result in an illegitimate consequence that he reconciles himself
with due to some ulterior motive.
The test set out by the Egyptian Court of Cassation in the case discussed above is useful
in this regard. According to the Court the practical key to knowing if dolus eventualis is
established or not is to ask the following question: while undertaking the intended act,
did the perpetrator want to do it even if the act goes beyond its original purpose to the
criminal act that actually happened and was not originally intended? If the answer is in
the affirmative, dolus eventualis is established. If the answer is negative, then the whole
matter is nothing more than an error that may be punishable or not depending on
whether the conditions establishing an error are present.
In order not to undervalue people’s lives and interest, particularly in contemporary
armed conflicts where civilians and their properties become the main targets and in or-
der to guarantee that patterns of behaviour are legitimate and consistent with the social
norms, it becomes inevitable, for all the aforementioned reasons, to adopt the concept of
dolus eventualis as the basis of intentional crimes under the Rome Statute of the Inter-
nationalCriminalCourt. Particularly in caseswhere there are clear evidence fromwhich
the Court can infer the perpetrator’s acceptance of the illegitimate consequences of his
act or his underestimation of the gravity of such consequences. Hence, dolus eventualis
should not be regarded in the same manner as unintentional errors which differ in their
nature, method and essence.142
As for estimating the sentence of the perpetrator who commits his crime based on dolus
eventualis, since the “will” in this type of intent is not as serious as in dolus directus, and
since the punishment should range from strong to lenient according to the gravity of the
crime the honourable judges of the International Criminal Court may use their discre-
tionary power accorded to them by the Statute.
Adopting the concept of dolus eventualis puts things on the right track and acknowl-
edges criminal responsibility based on the accurate balance between guilt and punish-
ment, so each degree of guilt has a corresponding punishment. This guarantees that jus-
tice among people prevails. This is considered the noblest aim sought by the Islamic
Sharı¯ah as God commands Prophet Muhammad in the Holy Qur’a¯n: . . .If you judge,
judge between them with justice . . .’ (Quran 5:42).
142 Ibid., at 673.
Mohamed Elewa Badar
130
